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ABSTRACT 
This project investigates Malaysia Airlines communicative efforts in the MH17-crisis. The 
theoretical  frame  consists  of  W.  Timothy  Coombs’  Situational  Crisis  Communication  Theory  
(SCCT) and Image Restoration Theory by William L. Benoit.   
The  Coombs’  analysis  entails  looking  at  the  contextual  factors  to  develop  relevant  strategies.  Benoit  
is used as a framework in the textual analysis to explore which strategies MAS employed - 
scrutinising press releases from the first 48 hours. 
We  compare  the  ‘ideal  handling’  of  SCCT  and  the  ‘actual  handling’  analysed  through  the  
terminology  of  Benoit’s  Image  Restoration  theory.    
Through the analyses we can conclude that MAS was effective in their communicative handling of 
the MH17-crisis but a strategy dealing with Expression of Sympathy should be additionally 
developed.  
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SUMMARY 
Dette projekt undersøger, hvor effektive Malaysia Airlines (MAS) har været i deres kommunikative 
håndtering af nedskydningen af deres fly MH17 i foråret 2014. For at opnå dette, har vi dannet en 
teoretisk ramme på baggrund af W. Timothy Coombs og William L. Benoit. Vi har valgt 
kommunikationskanalen pressemeddelelser og yderligere afgrænset vores empiri til de første 48 
timer efter nedskydningen af flyet.  
Vores valg af de to teoretikere bygger på to forskellige baggrundsforståelser.  Coombs’  teori  
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) har en situationsbestemt tilgang til 
krisekommunikation, der bygger på, at valget af kriseresponsstrategier skal matche den trussel, der 
truer virksomhedens omdømme. Ved implementering af denne, dannes en ideel håndtering af krisen 
på et teoretisk niveau.  Dette opnås ved at inddrage de kontekstuelle faktorer vedrørende krisen, 
såsom; krisehistorik og tidligere forhold til stakeholders. Her bliver det yderligere interessant da 
MAS var udsat for endnu en alvorlig krise, MH370’s  forsvinden,  kun  få  måneder  tidligere. 
Benoit’s  bidrag  om  imagegenoprettelse  er  blevet  brugt  i  sammenspil  med  en  tekstanalyse  af  MAS’  
pressemeddelelser, ved at kigge på, hvad der er blev sagt og hvordan dette kan ses i forhold til 
strategierne i teorien.  På  denne  måde  får  vi  opstillet  den  ‘ideelle  håndtering’  mod  den  ‘faktiske  
håndtering’  og  i  sammenligning  af  disse,  vil  vi  teoretisk  kunne  vurdere,  hvor  effektive  deres  
kommunikative handlen har været. 
Gennem vores arbejde kan vi konkludere, at der er mange sammenlignelige punkter mellem de 
SCCT strategier, og de strategier, der ud fra  Benoit,  er  blevet  implementeret  i  MAS’  
pressemeddelelser. Scapegoating, Excuse og Compensation, formuleret ved hjælp af SCCT, svarede 
til brugen af Shift in Blame, Compensation og Corrective Action.  
Ud fra vores teoretiske ramme, konkluderer vi, at MAS har været effektive i deres krisehåndtering. 
Det skal dog nævnes, at MAS er gået ud over de grænser, der ideelt foreslås af SCCT i deres brug 
af Compensation. Kompensationen favner ikke kun pårørende i krisen, men også alle deres kunder. 
Gennem vores undersøgelser fandt vi frem til, at brugen af sympati, spillede en større rolle end 
forklaret af vores teoretiker. Derfor kan vi yderligere konkludere, at sympati burde danne ramme 
for  en  ny  strategi  under  navnet  “Expression  of  Sympathy”. 
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INTRODUCTION  
On the 17th of July 2014, flight MH17 was heading to Kuala Lumpur from Amsterdam when it was 
shot down over Ukrainian territory. The flight belonged to Malaysia Airlines (MAS), who for the 
second time in a matter of a few months found themselves in another devastating crisis. This event 
was given enormous media attention both due to the geopolitical issues with Ukraine and the 
controversial nature of the previous crisis. Unanswered questions, inaccessibility to the crash site 
and adherence of responsibility being thrown in multiple directions have all resulted in ambiguity, 
which is still prevalent till this day. Given these unique circumstances, we found a great interest in 
understanding and seeing how Malaysia Airlines responded communicatively. 
 
The two organisational disasters described above, were a threat for the reputation of the company. 
Saving or repairing the reputation is of the uttermost importance for an organisation and it requires 
the appropriate management. Within the field of crisis management, the role of crisis 
communication is receiving more attention, when it comes to protecting the organisation's 
reputation in crisis situations.    
 
By adhering to one of the most influential crisis communication theorists, W. Timothy Coombs, we 
wish to gain an understanding of the importance of contextual elements when it comes to 
formulating the ideal crisis response. Additionally, we are also interested in examining what MAS 
actually  communicated.  Here  we  have  decided  to  use  William  L.  Benoit’s  Image Restoration 
Strategies to develop a textual analysis carried out by examining press releases published by MAS 
in the span of the first 48 hours from when MH17 was shot down. The overarching goal of this 
approach is to use these two analyses to determine the correlation and disparity between the 
theoretically ideal and the actual crisis response strategies executed. In this project we will focus on 
the sender, and we will therefore not be looking at any empirical data of how the crisis response 
was received.  
 
In light of this, we have formulated the following problem statement:  
 
“How  did  Malaysia  Airlines  respond  within  the  first  48-hours to the MH17 crisis vis-à-vis William 
L.  Benoit’s  theory  of  Image  Restoration  and  to  which  extent  does  it  correlate  with  W.  Timothy 
Coombs’  Situational  Crisis  Communication  Theory?” 
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Research questions   
RQ1: By implementing Situational Crisis Communication Theory to the crisis of MH17, how can 
this theory be utilised to formulate the most effective crisis response? 
 
RQ2:  How  can  the  theory  of  Image  Restoration  be  used  to  understand  Malaysia  Airlines’  crisis  
communication strategy?  
MAS COMPANY DESCRIPTION  
MAS is a government-owned airline based in Malaysia. The airline primarily flies within Asia but 
also have several routes heading out to Europe. The company was founded in 1937 to cater to the 
need of having an airline service between Panang and Singapore in order to ease trade (Malaysia 
Airlines, 2015). Within 10 years the company took on commercial flights and within another a 
decade, the airline grew into an international company by expanding the number of routes 
(Malaysia Airlines, 2015). Ever since, the company has continued to grow to reach the size it has 
today, ranking as number 31 on the top 100 companies in Malaysia (Horlic, 2010).  
CASE DESCRIPTION  
The following case description is based on the BBC article MH17 Malaysia plane crash in Ukraine: 
What we know (2014).  
On the 17th of July 2014, flight MH17 was heading from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur when it was 
shot down over Ukrainian territory, close to the Russian border. The plane was brought down in an 
area controlled by pro-Russian separatists. 
The crisis occurred during a rough period for MAS, as only a couple of months before, they had lost 
another plane, flight MH370. This flight was never recovered and the cause was never found.  
In the case of the MH17 crisis, MAS originally claimed that contact with the flight was lost four 
hours and 45 minutes after take-off. However, later it was revealed that the flight was actually shot 
down no more than three hours into the flight. To this day, no one has claimed responsibility for the 
crash, but evidence strongly suggests, that the plane was shot down by missiles supplied by the 
Russians to support the separatists:  
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“US officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said there was a "solid 
case" that a SA-11 missile - also known as Buk - was fired from eastern Ukraine under 
"conditions the Russians helped create" (BBC, 2014).  
Authorities claimed that flying in the area, at the height of 10.000 metres which MH70 was flying, 
should be safe. However, everything under 9753 metres was warned against, suggesting that the 
area was not considered completely safe. The aircraft was carrying 298 people - 15 of them 
crewmembers. There were no survivors. 
CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS  
The following section is devoted to elaborate on terms we find essential to our project. First, we 
will introduce and clarify the term stakeholders and thereafter, define the term crisis. The aim of 
these definitions is to clarify our perception of the terms as well as introduce how we will employ 
these in the report.  
Defining stakeholders   
In order to understand how MAS responded in the aftermath of the MH17 crisis, it is vital to 
understand that their response is a product of the expectations they believe the crisis has evoked 
from their stakeholders. The emphasis will be on how the sender communicated and thus what was 
actually said. This means, that the term stakeholder(s) will be used in more rough brush strokes as 
these will not be a primary focus. We categorise stakeholders according to the following definition: 
“A  stakeholder  is  a  person or group that is affected by or can affect an organization 
(...)”(Coombs,  2012:  2). 
In the crisis, investigated in this project, we consider the primary stakeholders to be: the next-of-
kin, shareholders, subsidiaries, employees, as well as current and potential investors.  
Defining a crisis  
Defining a crisis is vital in establishing the fundamental components in the theory of crisis 
communication. Crisis as a scholarly term appears elusive and researchers have not settled on one 
universally accepted definition. 
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Nevertheless, there has been advanced an amalgam of various perceptions of a crisis which is as 
following: 
“A  crisis  is  “the  perception  of  an  unpredictable  event  that  threatens  important  expectancies  
of   stakeholders   and   can   seriously   impact   an   organization’s   performances   and   generate  
negative  outcomes””  (Coombs,  2010:  19).   
The above-mentioned definitions should be understood as being interconnected. As described in the 
following  quote   “If   stakeholders   believe   there   is   a   crisis,   the   organization   is   in   a   crisis”.   (Heath,  
2010: 6). The perception and expectations of the stakeholders influence how a company should 
react in a crisis and if these expectations are broken or unmet it can have fatal consequences for the 
organisation involved. 
SCIENTIFIC THEORETICAL APPROACH  
In the project we take point of departure in a social constructivist approach, as we view crises, and 
communication in itself, as social constructions.  
In relation to our report, there is a somewhat twofold element. As Keith M. Hearit posits, there is no 
way to dismiss the idea that certain objective realities, or crises, exist (Helder et al, 2009: 340). The 
case of MH17 is of such a nature that it is hard to diverge from the perception that this is a crisis. 
But taking a social constructivist approach entails the notion that a crisis only becomes a crisis 
when meaning is adhered (Ibid.: 340). This view is in accordance with the approach to crisis 
communication taken in this project: that an organisation is in a crisis if it believed by stakeholders. 
An   organisation’s   reality   is   thus   not   only   determined,   but   also   shaped,   by   the   stakeholders’  
worldview.  Therefore  the  organisation’s  reality  is  a  social  construct.      
METHODS  
The section of Methods will encompass how the analyses of the project will be delimited and 
executed. Firstly, we will account for the limitations set in relation to the timeframe and the chosen 
platform.  Secondly  we  will  explain  how  Coombs’  Situational  Crisis  Communication  Theory  
(SCCT)  and  Benoit’s  Image  Restoration  Theory  will  be  used  in  order  to  frame our analyses. 
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Timeframe  
In order to streamline the analysis and provide a framework, parameters have to be set. The first 48 
hours are critical when handling a crisis since this is the time in which it is determined how the 
crisis is going to be perceived by stakeholders in the remainder of the process (Torossian, 2015). 
This means, that the organisation experiencing a crisis will have to be active in this time period in 
order to get a chance to influence how the crisis is perceived (Ibid.: 2015). We thus decided to limit 
our time frame to the first 48 hours after the shooting down of the plane. 
Platform  
An essential part of communicating is deciding what platform to engage, as different texts open for 
different expectations to the content (Jensen, 1997: 47). The chosen platform will influence the way 
the message is received and interpreted. This means, that the choice of platform will influence how 
the audience perceives the sender; in this case MAS. Since we have limited our focus to their 
immediate response, we find it logical to employ a platform that is most often used for immediate 
communication. We thus decided to work with official press releases as a basis for our analysis. We 
settled on press releases as the genre opens for expectations that were relevant for our analysis. The 
sender of press releases is most often the actor who the message revolves around. Thus it is the 
words of the company itself rather than someone else describing the situation. Furthermore, press 
releases are expected to be immediate and containing the latest information as soon as it is 
available.  This  granted  an  opportunity  to  analyse  MAS’  immediate  crisis  response. 
Approach to analysis  
The structure of the report is reflected in our choice of methods and approach to the analyses. The 
SCCT by Coombs is implemented in the first analysis to examine the context surrounding the 
MH17  crisis.  Furthermore,  Coombs’  SCCT  is  used  to  examine  what  strategies  MAS  should  have  
employed in their crisis response. The idea behind this is to craft a theoretically ideal crisis response 
based on our interpretation of the theory. The second analysis is a textual analysis of the press 
releases grounded in the Image Restoration Theory by Benoit. In order to open up our empirical 
data we will scrutinise the press releases, which will provide an overview of the crisis as well as 
their  response  (Ibid:  30).  Given  that  we  investigate  the  sender’s  response  to  the  MH17  crisis,  we  
will focus on the argumentation and rhetoric used by MAS in restoring their image. Our approach to 
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this analysis is to investigate the press releases by examining how the statements can be said to 
correspond to the five strategies presented by Benoit in relation to Image Restoration; these will be 
elaborated in the theory section.  Benoit’s  strategies  will  thus  work  as  a  fundament  for  a  thematic  
organisation of the statements. The aim of this analysis is to offer an understanding of how they 
actually responded to the MH17 crisis.  
The final step in our analysis is taking the theoretical ideal we gained from Coombs and compare it 
to  our  analysis  based  on  Benoit’s  five  strategies  to  see  what  correlation  and  diversion  there  is  
between these. Theoretically, these two approaches are open for comparison since Coombs 
strategies are in large  a  further  developed  version  of  Benoit’s  Image  Restoration  Strategies.   
THEORY  
In this section we will introduce our theoretical foundation, on which we will base our analyses. 
Firstly, we  will  introduce  Coombs’  theory  on  crisis  response  and  the  model of SCCT, which will 
lay the ground for determining the ideal crisis response for MAS. Secondly, we will explain 
Benoit’s  Image  Restoration  Theory  to  gain  an  understanding  of  what  was  actually  communicated  in  
their crisis response in order to repair their image. 
Crisis Response and Situational Crisis Communication Theory  
The content of crisis response can be divided into three sequential categories: 1) Instructing 
Information, which consists of two elements; informing people of what actions to take in order to 
protect themselves physically in a crisis situation. The other aspect is up keeping business 
continuity (Coombs, 2012: 146). 2) Adjusting Information deals with informing stakeholders about 
what took place and what is being done to avoid such a situation again or expressing sympathy with 
the victims (Coombs, 2012: 151). 3) Reputation Management deals with how an organisation can 
protect its reputation, which is inevitably under potential threat during a crisis. The main theory in 
reputation  management  is  SCCT.  This  theory  aims  to  gain  an  understanding  of  the  public’s  
perception of an organisation in the context of a crisis situation. SCCT has its theoretical foundation 
in Attribution Theory which, in broad strokes, concerns itself with the human nature of assigning 
responsibility and searching for cause in any event (Coombs, 2007:165). 
In  SCCT,  the  type  of  crisis  determines  the  organisation’s  crisis  responsibility. Three different types 
of crisis exist; the Victim Cluster, the Accidental Cluster and the Preventable Cluster (Coombs, 
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2002:180) and depending on which one of these is relevant in the crisis at hand the process of 
evaluating crisis responsibility can begin. 
Ultimately, SCCT offers specific Crisis Response Strategies based upon the type of crisis and the 
crisis responsibility of the organisation as assigned by the stakeholders. These strategies actively 
provide the users of this model with approaches  on  how  to  frame  the  organisation’s  position  in  
relation to the crisis. Different strategies all work with different frames and it is up to the 
communicator to choose which strategy and which frame would be the most beneficial in order to 
positively affect Behavioral Intentions from stakeholders.  
Additionally, Coombs provides a set of guidelines as recommendations for how organisations can 
use  Crisis  Response  Strategies  to  protect  a  reputation  from  the  affliction  of  a  crisis  (“V.  Appendix  - 
SCCT guidelines”) 
These guidelines will be implemented and elaborated upon in the analysis.  
Coombs has developed the theory into the following model: 
(Crisis situation model of SCCT Coombs, 2007:166) 
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This model introduces different variables, which together form the full picture of SCCT. The 
variables will not be elaborated upon in this chapter but will be further explained and implemented 
in the case analysis chapter.   
 
Image Restoration Theory  
The Image Restoration Theory posited by Benoit is centred on the need to retain a positive image 
(Elmasry & Chaudhri, 2010: 144).  
The theory is grounded on two basic assumptions: that communication is a goal-directed activity 
and that obtaining a positive reputation is an essential goal of communication (Benoit, 1995: 63). 
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Problems arise when the latter is not fulfilled viz. if the reputation of the organisation is under 
threat, which can possibly have negative impact on its image. The organisation will then feel 
obliged to take action. As Benoit explains: 
“(...) when our reputation is threatened, we feel compelled to offer explanations, defenses, 
justifications,  rationalizations,  apologies  or  excuses  for  our  behaviour“  (Ibid.:  70).   
The aim of the theory is thus to provide different Message Options i.e. what an organisation can say 
when faced with a crisis.  
The theory entails five strategies, some with variants, which all provide tools when an organisation 
is exposed to a crisis. Following, is a brief account for these strategies based on the text Image 
Repair Discourse and Crisis Communication (1997) by Benoit.  
 
Denial 
Consists of two variations; 1) Simple Denial, which is denying any accusations towards the 
organizations and 2) Shift the Blame which is arguing that someone else is responsible for the act.     
 
Evading Responsibility 
Four variants of this strategy exist. The first being Provocation; an organisation can claim to be 
responding to a provocation. Secondly there is Defeasibility where there is an allegation from the 
organisation that they lacked information or control over certain elements in the situation. As a third 
variant is the one of Accident, where the goal is to convince the audience that the crisis was a result 
of an accident. And finally the organisation can express that the act occurred was performed with 
Good Intentions and thus reducing the ill feelings towards it.  
 
Reducing Offensiveness 
This strategy consists of six different versions. The first being Bolstering; which is used to bolster 
the  audience’s  positive  feelings  towards  the  organisation conducive to offset the negative feelings 
towards the wrongful act. The second Minimization entails the attempt to mitigate the negative 
feelings towards the wrongful act. Differentiation is employed when the act is distinguished from 
acts of the same character but is considered more offensive. The fourth, Transcendence, presents 
the incident in a better light. Attack Accuser is where the accused turns the allegations towards the 
accuser. Lastly, the organisation can offer Compensation, which can improve the image of the 
organisation if accepted by the audiences. 
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Corrective Action 
The organisation promises in various ways to correct the problem by preventing future similar 
situations and restoring things to a pre-crisis status.  
 Mortification 
The strategy of mortification entails the organisation confessing and then asking for forgiveness.  
 
These strategies will also be further elaborated upon in the analysis. 
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ANALYSIS  
This chapter is devoted to carry out the analyses of our project in order to answer our problem 
statement.  Thus,  we  will  commence  by  conducting  a  contextual  analysis  based  on  Coombs’  SCCT.  
This is conducted to gain an understanding of how MAS ideally should have communicated in the 
aftermath of the MH17 incident based on their history and prior reputation. The next step of the 
chapter is  concerned  with  a  textual  analysis  based  on  Benoit’s five Image Restoration Strategies, 
focusing on how they actually responded on the incident. 
Finally,  a  comparative  analysis  will  be  conducted  to  see  if  MAS’  actual  statements correspond to 
the ideal crisis response we reached by including contextual factors as introduced in SCCT.   
 
Contextual analysis  
The ambition with this analysis is to apply SCCT to the case of MH17. Following the model 
presented in the theory chapter, we will systematically go through all the relevant steps in order to 
account for factors deemed important when theoretically selecting an ideal crisis response. The goal 
here is to take all significant information and process it so we end up with suitable crisis response 
strategies which we feel would be optimal for MAS in order to have the best possible outcome. 
 
Before employing the model of SCCT, it is necessary to assess the role of two categories; 
instructing and adjusting information. Coombs acknowledges that the sole emphasis on reputation 
management  is  a  somewhat  shallow  focus.  Rather  “SCCT  acknowledges  that  people  are  the  first  
priority  in  a  crisis”  (Coombs,  2012:  159). The attention to the reputation of the organisation should 
then only be of concern after instructing and adjusting information. 
 
Instructing information  
In the case of MH17, only one aspect of instructing information should be implemented. By looking 
at the sequence of events it can be derived that the danger to the stakeholders is no longer prevalent. 
A  plane  has  been  shot  down  and  there  is  thus  no  need  for  MAS’  to  instruct  stakeholders  on  how  to  
protect themselves physically.  
The second aspect is that of business continuity, which entails assuring stakeholders all the steps the 
organisation will take to uphold daily operations and to restore the business to usual. It is a major 
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airline and their day-to-day operations affect many passengers. Therefore it is important to make 
sure that these passengers are instructed in what is taking place. (Coombs, 2012: 148).  
 
Adjusting information  
“Adjusting  information  helps  the  stakeholder  cope  psychologically  with  the  crisis.”  (Coombs,  2012:  
148). This can be done in two ways in the MH17 crisis.  
Firstly, corrective actions is done by reassuring stakeholders not only that their safety is a priority 
but also what is being done to prevent further harm. MAS could do this by making sure to 
communicate to their stakeholders that they are cancelling all aircrafts over Ukraine and also 
promise to do everything within their power that they are investigating what exactly happened.  
 
Crises have the potential to generate a wholly new group of stakeholders viz. victims, people who 
have suffered from the crisis (Coombs, 2012: 151). This crisis encompasses a plane being shot 
down and thereby casualties in numbers. The victims, following this line of thought, are the 
families of the deceased. There are certain expectations organisations have to meet and victims 
anticipate the organisation to express concern for them.  
In their first communication efforts, MAS should then be sure to express sympathy and compassion 
towards the victims. This supports the underlying idea that stakeholders should always be the 
number one priority.  
After instructing and adjusting information the third step is reputation management.  
 
The reputational threat   
Initial Crisis Responsibility   
The  underlying  belief  in  reputation  management  in  a  crisis  is  the  notion  that  the  organisation’s  
reputation is under threat. 
Coombs  writes:  “The  first  step  in  assessing  the  reputational  threat  is  to determine the initial crisis 
responsibility  attached  to  a  crisis’’  (Coombs,  2007:168).  This  is  done, by identifying the crisis type. 
By classifying the crisis type, the organisation can forecast the amount of crisis responsibility 
stakeholders will attribute to the organisation (Ibid.:168). Coombs has formulated a model 
containing  three  crisis  clusters  which  are  all  further  broken  down  into  13  crisis  types  (“III.  
Appendix - Coombs  crisis  response  strategies”). 
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Given the parameters presented by SCCT we have determined the MH17 crisis to belong under the 
crisis type Malevolence which falls within the victim  cluster;;  defined  by  Coombs  as:  “Damage  by  
an  external  agent  against  an  organization”  (Coombs  &  Holladay,  2002:171). This assessment is 
made based on the fact, that the aircraft was shot down by unknown agents. For a full breakdown of 
the events regarding the crisis see the case description  (“VII. Appendix - Breakdown of MH17”) 
According to Coombs, the nature of the victim cluster is that there are weak attributions of crisis 
responsibility and that translates to a Mild Reputational Threat (“II.  Appendix  - Coombs Crisis 
cluster  model”).  Following  this  line  of  thought  stakeholders  ought  not to blame MAS for the crisis. 
 
The next step is to look at some of the other factors, deemed important by the SCCT model, 
regarding the MH17 crisis, to gain a full picture of the crisis responsibility of MAS. 
 
Intensifying Factors 
The second step in evaluating the reputational threat is to look at the two intensifying factors viz. 
Crisis History and Prior Relationship Reputation. These factors constitute the full-fledged 
representation of what level of crisis responsibility the stakeholders attribute to MAS. 
Prior to 2014, the airline was the winner of multiple awards, the company was even placed in the 
top  ten  of  the  world’s  Top  100  Airlines  (World  Airline  Awards,  2012)  and  is  the  holder  of  one  of  
the best safety records in Asia (Govindasamy, 2015). But on the 8th of March 2014 the MH370 
aircraft went missing over the Southern Indian Ocean and became one of the most media covered 
disasters. The broad conception amongst crisis management experts is that the crisis was handled 
poorly. Their handling of the situation led to confusion and anger amongst family members and 
other stakeholders and ultimately made matters worse (Hildebrandt, 2014). For more details of the 
MH370  crisis,  see  “IV.  Appendix  - Breakdown  of  MH370”.  Therefore,  the  MH17  case  is  
particularly interesting because both of the intensifying factors are at play and are immensely vital 
in assessing the reputational threat. The lack of care towards family members shown during the 
MH370 crisis and the impotence in controlling the situation, which is to be expected from an 
organisation of their character, has resulted in a poor relationship reputation with their stakeholders.  
The presence of  these  two  factors  provides  us  with  a  new  outlook  on  MAS’  crisis  responsibility.  
Initially, we deemed the attribution of crisis responsibility to be weak, but taking the intensifying 
factors into consideration, the situation looks different. According to Coombs:  “A  victim  crisis  
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generates the same reputational threat as an accident crisis when there is a history of crises and/or 
an  unfavorable  prior  relationship  reputation”  (Coombs,  2007:  168).   
And thus, the reputational threat is no longer to be seen as mild but has increased to Moderate, 
which is the reputational threat belonging to the accidental cluster. 
 
Emotions 
As Coombs posits, crisis responsibility causes emotional reactions.  
“Increased  attributions  of  crisis  responsibility  generate  stronger  feelings  of  anger  (...)  while  also  
reducing  feelings  of  sympathy  for  the  organization.”  (Coombs,  2007:  169) 
The crisis responsibility is related to what emotions the stakeholders experience vis-à-vis the crisis. 
The three most important emotions in attribution theory in relation to crisis management are: 
Sympathy, Anger and Schadenfreude (Coombs & Holladay, 2005: 265). The first two emotions are 
self-evident but the latter, schadenfreude, is defined by taking joy in the pain of others. (Coombs, 
2010: 39) 
Since we have determined the reputational threat to be moderate, we can conclude that there should 
be no strong emotions from the stakeholders. There ought not to be strong feelings of anger or 
schadenfreude, but since there is some responsibility, sympathy towards the company is reduced 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2005: 270). We will return to the concept of emotions later as it bears 
importance for the choice of strategy. 
 
Organizational Reputation  
As  we  concluded  in  the  former  sections,  there  is  a  moderate  threat  to  MAS’  reputation.  
Furthermore, the two intensifying factors are again at play since their battered crisis history and 
prior  relationship  to  stakeholders  are  less  than  positive  resulting  in  further  damage  to  the  company’s  
reputation. This reputation is constituted by the vital relationship between the company and their 
stakeholders. Any changes in this reputation can have behavioural complications.  
The emotions and the crisis responsibility, will according to the SCCT model, change the reputation 
and lead to stakeholders displaying behavioural intentions which are non-supportive of the 
company (Coombs, 2007: 169). 
This can lead to customers deciding not to travel with them and refusing their support in a myriad 
of other ways. The effects for the company would, in this instance, be catastrophic since they would 
lead to negative economic consequences, which in the worst case could lead to bankruptcy. 
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Crisis Response Strategies  
Having assessed the reputational threat and the possible ramifications of the MH17 crisis it is time 
to choose the appropriate crisis response strategy. By drawing on Attribution Theory, SCCT 
provides a theoretical picture of how the MH17 crisis would be perceived by the stakeholders, if no 
communication strategy, is  implemented  by  MAS.  By  not  influencing  the  stakeholders’  perception  
in any active way, the stakeholders will instead attribute responsibility and emotions solemnly 
based on the above-explained factors.  
What SCCT then offers, is a range of different strategies  with  the  aim  of  altering  stakeholders’  
perceptions  and  attributions  towards  the  company’s  crisis  responsibility,  reputation  and  their  
emotions. These strategies all take their baseline in the elements discussed above and are 
appropriated according to the context of the crisis taking all these different factors into 
consideration  when  it  comes  to  their  implementation.  This  list  can  be  found  in  “III.  Appendix  - 
Coombs’  crisis  response  strategies”. 
To support these choices, we  have  followed  Coombs’  recommendations for crisis response 
selection. The full list of guidelines can be found in  “V.  Appendix  - SCCT recommendations for 
crisis  response  selection”. 
 
Denial response strategies: Scapegoating 
A strategy that appears suitable is the one of scapegoating, which appears under the Denial 
Strategies. The goal of this strategy is to remove any connection the organisation has with the crisis. 
The premise encompasses the notion that if the organisation is not involved in the crisis, it will not 
take any damage from the event. 
In the case of MH17, MAS did in fact not have any participation in the sequence of events. 
Stressing this lack of blame would de facto reinforce the frame of them being a victim of the crisis 
and nothing else. Thus reassuring stakeholders that external agents outside of the organisation is to 
be blamed. (Coombs 2007: 170) The strategy would help them in denying their role in the crisis.  
An implementation of this strategy would shift the frame and diminish the reputational threat and 
thus seek to change the frame from being the accidental cluster and bolster the crisis to abide as part 
of the victim cluster instead. 
This would have a direct impact on the behavioural intentions of the stakeholders giving them 
reasons to continue their support.  
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Diminish response strategies: Excuse  
The Excuse Response is categorised under the Diminish Strategy and its aim is to lessen the 
organisation’s  connection  to  the  crisis.  This  strategy  is  recommended  by  Coombs  when  there  is  a  
victim crisis and the two  intensifying  factors  are  present  (“V.  Appendix  - SCCT recommendations 
for  crisis  response  selection”). 
MH17 was shot down by Ukrainian or Russian separatists over an airspace which was confirmed as 
being for commercial flights. In that way, MAS actually did not have any control over the event and 
thus it would make sense to emphasise the lack of control and intent by the company. Further value 
will be gained as it confirms the crisis as being placed in the accident cluster, which is the cluster 
we determined  the  crisis  to  be  in.  This  strategy  would  then  alter  the  company’s  crisis  responsibility,  
as they did not have control over the events. The reputational threat is diminished due to the nature 
of the events framed in an ‘out-of-our-control’  frame.  The  emotions would maintain the same 
strength, or rather, lack of strength. Combining all these different ways, this strategy influences the 
factors of the SCCT model and the behavioural intentions of the stakeholders should be more 
positively inclined. The stakeholders will continue to support the company as the crisis is deemed to 
be caused by an external agent and thus MAS cannot be at fault for the shooting down of MH17.   
 
Rebuilding response strategies: Compensation 
Choosing to go with a Rebuilding Response as Compensation would be an attempt to positively 
impact  MAS’  reputation  by  offering  aid  to  the  victims  of  the  MH17  crisis.  The  reasoning  for  this  
type of strategy is due to the fact that we are dealing with an accidental crisis, which is combined 
with poor crisis history and prior relationship reputation (Coombs, 2007: 172).  Instead of offering 
monetary compensation to the families of the casualties, which could be seen as tasteless and have 
negative impacts in form of strong emotions of anger, the compensation should rather consist of 
therapy and other aid of that nature, paid by MAS. When offering this compensation the company 
would then actively make positive decisions that benefit the stakeholders. These positive actions 
would  influence  stakeholders’  emotions  in  such  a  way  that  anger  and  schadenfreude  would  be  non-
existent. Additionally, the reputation would improve because of the positive nature of the 
compensation. Combined with the excuse strategy, this would have even greater positive effects 
since MAS is trying to benefit stakeholders even though they are not to blame for the crisis. 
Overall,  this  should  provide  large  improvements  to  the  company’s  reputation  and  the  behavioural 
intentions derived from this, coupled with the emotions, should be supportive. The effectiveness of 
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this strategy should then incline stakeholders to show support overall.  
 
Secondary crisis response strategy: Victimage 
An important supplement to the abovementioned crisis response strategies is the strategy of 
Victimage, which falls under the Bolstering crisis  response  strategy  in  SCCT  (“III. Appendix - 
Coombs  crisis  response  strategies”).  The  three  strategies  of  scapegoating,  excuse  and  compensation  
position themselves with the idea that the events leading up to, and resulting in, the crisis are the 
cause of an external agent. Thus, these strategies should be enhanced with the victimage strategy; 
that is, for MAS to place themselves in the position of being the victim of this crisis. Either within 
the excuse strategy or the scapegoat strategy there is room for proclaiming themselves as victims of 
a malevolent act of an external agent because of all the contextual facts presented earlier in this 
chapter. The aim of victimage as a secondary strategy would be to strengthen the emotion of 
sympathy in order to affect the behavioural intentions of the stakeholders. In that sense, sympathy 
would serve as an intensifying element and further reinforcing the primary strategies and resulting 
in a different attribution of MAS’  crisis  responsibility.  This  would  affect  the  company’s  reputation  
positively, and culminating in behavioural intentions which would be supportive for the company.  
 
Conclusion  
Concluding this chapter, we note that any of the three primary strategies could be suitable in the 
case  of  MH17.  All  the  above  factors  displayed  how  MAS’  role  in  this  crisis  was  one  of  little  to  
moderate responsibility. The chosen strategies share a similar point of departure given that they all 
serve to emphasise the little role MAS has had in the sequence of events. This, of course, is why the 
secondary strategy of victimage stood out as being especially supplemental to this particular crisis. 
Given all this, we argue that they should have implemented these strategies in order to influence the 
stakeholders’  perception  of  the  crisis  and  thus  place  themselves  in  a  more  favourable light. 
Following the recommendations, excuse and compensation could even be used in combination with 
each  other.  Coombs’  guidelines initially recommend that the strategy of scapegoating should not be 
employed alongside the two other strategies. But after examining the crisis, we would argue, that all 
three strategies should be combined.  
 
 22 
Textual analysis  
By using the press releases published by MAS within the first 48 hours of the crisis as empirical 
data, this chapter will contain a textual analysis with a focus on the theory of Image Restoration by 
Benoit. The press releases will be scrutinized in the light of the five image restoration strategies and 
interpreted before organised thematically. With this approach in mind, the analysis will be 
presented according to the presence of the strategies rather than the chronological order of the press 
releases. Before embarking on this analysis two notes must be mentioned:  
1) We are attentive to the fact that two external agents have been implemented in the press releases 
viz. the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, and the Minister of Transport, Liow Tiong Lai. 
However, seeing the statements as being posted through the channel of the official Pressroom, all 
statements scrutinised have been analysed on equal terms. 
2)  All  the  press  releases  by  MAS  can  be  found  in  “I.  Appendix  - Malaysia Airlines media 
statements” 
 
Denial  
Benoit introduces the category of Denial, containing two strategies; shift in blame and simple 
denial. Since MAS cannot deny the MH17 incident, looking at simple denial will not be relevant. 
Rather we will focus on how they are aiming at shifting the blame. According to Benoit, shift in 
blame is in many cases an effective strategy as it aims at shifting the ill feelings away from the 
accused and towards someone else (Benoit, 1995: 76). 
 
Shift in blame:  
Throughout the first 48 hours, MAS consistently aims at clarifying that the crisis was not their fault 
and that they acted according to flight restrictions issued by The International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, The International Air Transportation Association, Eurocontrol and Ukrainian air 
traffic control. In relation to shift in blame, addressing these authorities enables them to shift 
responsibility towards external organisations. They try to shift the perceived responsibility of the 
act from themselves, since the one who is perceived responsible is the one who is blamed by 
stakeholders. The second press release, is a statement from the Malaysian Prime Minister, who 
stresses  the  responsibility  from  authorities  as:  “International  Air  transportation  Association  stated  
that  the  airspace  the  aircraft  was  traversing  was  not  subject  to  restrictions”  and  furthermore  “(...) the 
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flight  route  was  declared  safe  by  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organisation”  (“I.  Appendix  - 
Statement  by  Prime  Minister”).  In  their  attempt  to  disclaim  responsibility  and  shift  the  blame  
towards authorities, they make use of a prominent figure and his position as the Prime Minister to 
reinforce their message. The authoritative organisations are mentioned several times vis-à-vis the 
permission granted to MAS for the flight route. In the media statement 4, attention is brought to 
Eurocontrol who approved  the  MH17’s  flight  plan  and  “(...) who are solely responsible for 
determining  civil  aircraft  flight  path  over  European  airspace”  (“I.  Appendix  - Media  statement  4”).  
This is furthermore supported in the statement by the Malaysian Minister of Transportation, who 
states that MAS were not to blame as they acted in accordance to the instructions set by 
Eurocontrol,  but  rules  were  broken  elsewhere:  “The  flight  and  its  operators  followed  the  rules.  But  
on  the  ground,  the  rules  of  war  were  broken”  (“I.  Appendix - Statement by Minister of 
Transport”).    
 
During the timeframe we are investigating, the focus  of  MAS’  statements  appears to shift from an 
initial focus on the flight route, towards a focus on the investigation of the incident. This is 
formulated by the Malaysian Minister of Transportation: 
“Interfering  with  the  scene  of  the  crash  risks  undermining  the  investigation  itself.  Any  
actions that prevent us from learning the truth about what happened to MH17 cannot be 
tolerated. Failure to stop such interference  would  be  a  betrayal  of  the  lives  that  were  lost”  
(“I.  Appendix  - Statement  by  Minister  of  Transport”).  
Here they blame external factors for why they are neither able to investigate the incident further nor 
provide the desired information to the stakeholders.  
 
Evading Responsibility   
Benoit describes this strategy as a tool, which can be useful if the accused is not able to deny that 
they performed the act, but instead the company can evade responsibility by stating that the 
consequences of the act is not their responsibility (Benoit, 1995: 76). The strategy consists of four 
variants; provocation, defeasibility, accidents and good intentions. These can be used to enhance a 
company’s  agenda,  which  is  to  reduce  or  evade  the  perceived  responsibility.  Three of the strategies 
are of significance in the case of MAS and will be employed in the analysis in the following 
section.  
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Defeasibility 
The strategy of defeasibility refers to the attempt of implying a lack of information or control in 
relation to the incident. Two approaches to defeasibility can be found in the press releases and 
contain expressed lack of control and information. The first one focuses on the prevention of the 
accident:  “Malaysia  Airlines  confirms  that  the  aircraft  did  not  make  a  distress  call.”  (“I.  Appendix  - 
Media  Statement  2”).  Since  MAS  did  not  receive  a  distress  call  they  had  nothing  to  act  on,  and  thus  
they could not have prevented the incident. This enhances the opportunity for the company not to be 
held as main responsible for the incident. The second example addresses an element which too was 
salient in the implementation of the shift in blame strategy viz. the lack of access in the 
investigation process.    
“Malaysia  is  deeply  concerned  that  the  crash  site  has  not  been  properly  secured.  The  integrity  of  the  
site has been compromised, and there are indications that vital evidence has not been preserved in 
place.”  (“I. Appendix - Statement  by  Minister  of  Transport”) 
This statement underlines that MAS has not had the opportunity to secure the crash site and thus 
gather vital information. Since the evidence has not been secured there is a risk that some 
information regarding the crash might have been lost. This leads to them not having received full 
information and thus not being able to give a detailed explanation to the stakeholders.   
 
Accident 
This strategy is concerned with the notion that you can only hold others responsible for actions over 
which they have control. Thus, if an incident can be ascribed as being an accident, the actor can 
only be held partly responsible (Benoit, 1995: 76).  
Several aspects of the MAS incident can be ascribed to the strategy of accident. Firstly, the airspace 
was declared safe and without restrictions meaning they could not have anticipated being shot 
down.  Secondly,  the  aircraft  had  passed  every  check  and  had  a  clean  maintenance  record  “The  
B777-200 aircraft bearing registration no. 9M-MRD that operated MH17 on 17 July, 2014 had a 
clean  maintenance  record”  (“I.  Appendix  - Media  Statement  3”).  Furthermore,  all  communication  
systems on the aircraft were functioning properly. (“I.  Appendix  - Media  Statement  3”).   And lastly, 
there were another aircraft travelling in the particular airspace at the same time as the incident: 
“The  route  over  Ukrainian  airspace  where  the  incident  occurred  is  commonly  used  for  Europe  to  
Asia flights. A flight from a different carrier was on the same route at the time of the MH17 
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incident,  as  were  a  number  of  other  flights  from  other  carriers  in  the  days  and  weeks  before”  (“I.  
Appendix - Media  Statement  4”). 
These factors underline that the route MH17 was following was declared secure and that other 
aircrafts were flying in the same airspace around the same time as MH17 supports that the incident 
was accidental.   
 
Good Intentions 
The last variant belonging to the strategy of Evading Responsibility, should be seen in relation to 
the abovementioned accident strategy.  
As described in the section above, MAS acted in accordance with regulations set forward by the 
authorities, the aircraft lived up to the expectations, and the airspace was commonly used by 
aircrafts traveling from Europe to Asia  (“I.  Appendix  - Media  Statement  4”). 
It becomes apparent that they are trying to give the impression that they abided by the international 
standards: 
“It  followed  a  route  which  was  set  out  by  the  international  aviation  authorities,  approved  by  
Eurocontrol, and used by hundreds of other aircraft. It flew at an altitude set, and deemed 
safe, by the local air traffic control. And it never strayed into restricted airspace. The flight 
and  its  operators  followed  the  rules.”  (“I.  Appendix  - Statement by Minister  of  Transport”) 
 
By aiming at reaching these standards they can be assumed to have acted with good intentions. 
According to Benoit, when acting with good intentions, the company has a chance of disclaiming 
responsibility, as the outcome of the act was not intended (Benoit, 1995: 77). Thereby, MAS has a 
chance of avoiding ill feelings from the stakeholders, as it is reasonable to believe that they have 
acted with good intentions.  
 
Evading responsibility is a recurring strategy in the media statements. MAS underline how they had 
no way to prevent the crisis and how their access to information is very limited as an example of 
defeasibility. Additionally, accident is also employed; by explaining the following of all regulations 
possible in order to secure a safe flight and thus they cannot be held accountable for the unfortunate 
events. Their strict adherence to rules also serves as a highlighting of good intentions and thereby 
their responsibility of the act is abated.  
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Reduce Offensiveness  
The strategy is concerned with reducing the unfavourable feelings towards the actor or the act 
(Benoit, 1995: 77). This strategy has six versions and through our analysis of the press releases we 
have been able to identify the presence of two viz. bolstering and compensation.  
 
Bolstering 
Benoit  describes  this  strategy  as  being  an  attempt  to  bolster  the  stakeholder’s  attitude  towards  the  
organisation and in that way offsetting any negativity associated with the crisis. This is done by 
emphasising or describing positive traits and actions performed by the organisation (Benoit, 1997: 
180).  Bolstering  attempts  can  be  seen  in  media  statement  4.  By  looking  at  the  quotes  “[The  aircraft]  
had  a  clean  maintenance  record’’  and  “(...)  had  a  clean  bill  of  health.”  (“I.  Appendix  - Media 
Statement  3”)  we  can  clearly  see  that  MAS  is  attempting  to  emphasise  the  fact  that  the  aircraft  was  
in impeccable condition and thus capable of flying the route without any internal problems. 
Additionally, they underline positive traits by focusing on the preventative actions taken by the 
organisation:  “In  April,  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization  identified  an  area  over  the  
Crimean Peninsula as risky. At no point did MH17 fly into, or request to fly into, this area.”  (“I.  
Appendix - Media  Statement  4”).    
We interpret this emphasis as an attempt to stress the good traits, which in this case is the perfect 
flight record of the aircraft. 
Furthermore, another take on bolstering entails that the company draws on sympathy to change the 
way the stakeholders perceive them (Benoit, 1997: 180). Throughout the press releases it is evident 
that  they  employ  sympathy,  as  the  example  shows;;  ”(...)  our  thoughts  and  prayers  are  with  the  
family and friends of those onboard the flight.”  (“I.  Appendix  - Statement  by  Prime  Minister”).  We  
see this as a way to change the feelings the stakeholders have towards the company. By appearing 
remorseful, MAS can regain support from their stakeholders as it becomes evident that they are 
truly touched  by  the  crisis;;  “Malaysia  Airlines  deeply  regrets  the  loss  of  MH17,  and  is  very  much  
appreciative  of  the  support  of  our  passengers.”  (“I.  Appendix  - Media  Statement  5”).  Since  the  
purpose of bolstering is to change the perception stakeholders have of the company, showing 
sympathy  becomes  a  valuable  tool  to  recover  the  company’s  image.   
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Compensation 
According to Benoit, the organisation can decide to offer monetary compensation or compensation 
in form of different types of aid to the victims. If the victim accepts the chosen form of 
compensation it can help improve the image of the organisation (Benoit, 1997: 181).  
Attempts of compensation can be seen in the media statement 6 in full. The media statement starts 
by  stating:  “In  light  of  the  MH17  incident, Malaysia Airlines will be waiving any change fees for 
passengers  who  wish  to  make  changes  to  their  itinerary  to  any  MH  destinations”  (“I.  Appendix  - 
Media  Statement  5”),  and  the  rest  of  the  statement  is  elaborating  on  this  point.  What  can  be  seen  in  
the strategy is that there is a sole focus on the victims; in our case the next-of-kin (Benoit, 1997: 
181). But in light of the magnitude of the crisis, it becomes clear that it is not solely the next-of-kin 
who is affected, but rather customers in general. MAS offers the chance for all their passengers to 
postpone  or  cancel  their  travel  plans  (“I.  Appendix  - Media  Statement  5”),  and  in  that  way  also  
compensating everyone who might indirectly be affected by the crisis. 
The other aspect of their compensation strategies  aligns  closer  with  Benoit’s  original  thoughts  
regarding  compensation  to  the  victims.  The  quote:  “Malaysia  Airlines  is  deploying  its  “Go  Team”  
to Amsterdam with a group of caregivers and volunteers to assist the family members of the 
passengers.”, from media statement 2, is a clear example of how MAS is offering a non-monetary 
aid to the next-of-kin. Instead, this compensation consists of a different type of support, which is 
more psychological or emotional.   
MAS is thus trying to repair their image by appealing to all those afflicted by the crisis, both 
through ticket refunds as compensation for all their current customers and through emergency 
support for the families of the victims.  
 
Analysing the media statements through the lens of the Reducing Offensiveness strategy it is evident 
that MAS has tried to employ this strategy in certain ways. Bolstering has been used frequently 
throughout the statements, while the entirety of media statement 6 is dedicated to the compensation 
strategy. In our opinion, this makes perfect sense, due to the magnitude of the MH17 crisis. 
Bolstering  is  concerned  with  changing  stakeholders’  perception  of  the  company  and  MAS  is  
achieving this by emphasising the clear maintenance records of the flight, their prior abstention 
from flying into risky areas, as well as showing sympathy to the victims. Compensation could also 
be an effective strategy since it addresses all future passengers and they are actively seeking to 
repair their image by offering tangible compensation.  The  passengers’  offensiveness  could  then  be  
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reduced since MAS is displaying an understanding of the magnitude of the event and a willingness 
to do everything possible to fulfil the needs of all affected.  
 
Corrective Action  
The Corrective Action strategy is concerned with the organisation ensuring to correct the problem - 
either through restoring to pre-crisis state or through preventing another similar crisis to occur in the 
future (Benoit, 1997: 181). 
This strategy has been greatly employed by MAS and is one of their most used. Starting with the 
Prime  Minister’s  statement, the focus on how the company plans to solve the problem is evident: 
“But  we  must  – and we will – find out precisely what happened to this flight. No stone can be left 
unturned”  (“I.  Appendix  -Statement  by  Prime  Minister”).  Before  proceeding,  it  is  important  to  
account for the nuances within the conceptualisation of the incident. The promises of corrective 
action does not only consist of assuring that a similar crisis will not happen again, or restoring the 
state of affairs prior to the crisis, but also uncovering the uncertainty and opaqueness surrounding 
the crisis. MH17 was shot down in a country at war and there was, and still is, conflicting reports of 
responsibility allocation  within  the  geopolitical  factors  at  play  (“I.  Appendix  -Statement by Minister 
of  Transport”).   
This idea of trying to uncover what really happened with flight MH17 is established in the 
statement by the Minister of Transport and is pursued throughout all the following media 
statements. The statement by the Prime Minister builds further on this and his statement consists of 
a breakdown of how not only MAS, but also the government of Malaysia, plans to uncover the 
circumstances and bring the ones responsible  to  justice  (“I.  Appendix  - Statement by Prime 
Minister”).  The  corrective  action  shines  through  in  the  media  statements  by  MAS  as  well.  
Statement 7 contains an account of how they have already proceeded:  
“(...)  Malaysia  Airlines  deployed  a  ferry  flight  last night mobilizing 212 personnel from 
various government and media bodies and its staff to Kiev and Amsterdam in a special 
mission  for  MH17.  (...)  85  Malaysia  Airlines’  ‘Go  Team’  members  have  been  deployed,  of  
which  five  members  will  join  Malaysia’s  Special Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (...) 
while 80 other members comprising caregivers and the management team will be stationed in 
Amsterdam  to  assist  the  family  members  of  the  passengers.’’  (“I.  Appendix  - Media 
Statement  7”) 
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The quest in finding the truth about what happened manifests itself further in the media statements 
where they are accounting for the number and nationality of passengers on board  (“I.  Appendix  - 
Media  Statement  2”).  We  will  argue  that  corrective  action  in  these  media  statements has 
transformed into a quest of truth seeking. The aforementioned geopolitical circumstances of the 
crisis have shrouded the event in mystery and MAS are now using this mystery to their benefit. 
Normally, an aircraft carrier is expected to know the exact information about their passengers but in 
the  very  first  official  statement  they  disclose  wrong  information  (“I.  Appendix  - Media Statement 
2”).  Rather  they  are  revealing  information  as  the  hour  passes  and  it  is  not  until  the  third  statement  
that they correct the wrongful information. They attempt to ascribe their lack of knowledge of the 
exact passengers to the non-transparency of the other factors of the crisis. In that way, the corrective 
action turned truth seeking, which allows for more leeway even though they are not only 
investigating what happened to cause the shooting down of MH17, but also how many passengers 
were actually present on the aircraft.  
When  it  comes  to  the  internal  reasoning  behind  the  corrective  strategy,  Benoit  explains  that:  “While  
people frequently want to know whom to blame, it is more reassuring to know that steps have been 
taken  to  eliminate  or  avoid  future  problems.’’  and  “Even  those  who  are  innocent  of  wrong-doing 
can benefit from plans for preventing recurrence of the problem.”  (Benoit,  1997:  184).  It  can  be  
argued that MAS puts stronger emphasis on truth seeking rather than corrective action, as they are 
not primarily focusing on the above-mentioned notions. However, given the circumstances of the 
crisis, it can be argued that their approach to corrective action in form of truth seeking is justified. 
Their possible success in uncovering the truth would lead to what corrective action should do. By 
finding out where the true responsibility lies, they can ensure that the guilty parties are being 
punished and thus assuring that a similar crisis will not take place.  
 
Conclusion  
In the textual analysis of the press releases, we have identified the appearance and use of different 
image restoration strategies and their variations. The most prominent of these are shift in blame, 
bolstering, compensation and corrective action. These four strategies help shape the narrative of 
MAS having very little to no blame in the events leading up to the crisis. The blame is assigned to 
external and uncontrollable factors but they are still willing to compensate their customers. 
Furthermore, they take it upon themselves to lead a quest of truth seeking in order to uncover the 
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exact circumstances and perpetrators of the crisis as parts of their corrective action promises. 
Through the use of compensation and corrective action they present themselves as caring for their 
stakeholders. This is supported by the use of sympathy shown as it strengthens their image as being 
a company that cares for their customers. Additionally, there is the use of strategies such as good 
intentions and defeasibility, which are also supporting the overall impression they are trying to 
present to their stakeholders. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Throughout the project there has been a clear and conscious separation between the two analyses, 
employing  Benoit’s  Image  Restoration  Theory  and  Coombs’  SCCT  separately.  The  following  
chapter is an attempt to combine these two approaches in order to realise a full understanding 
regarding  MAS’  crisis response. The textual analysis of the press releases provided a picture of 
what strategies were employed when responding communicatively to their stakeholders. SCCT, on 
the other hand, presented a range of different response strategies, which would be ideal when taking 
all the contextual matters regarding the crisis into consideration.  
MAS’  overall  strategy  was  to  establish  a  distance  from  the  happenings  leading  up  to  the  crisis  by  
shifting the blame to external factors while still providing compensation to their customers. 
Additionally, they placed emphasis on communicating that they were doing everything within their 
power to try and find who and what caused the crisis. In that way, their denial and corrective action 
form a two-step response strategy; they are not only shifting the blame, but they are also actively 
trying  to  figure  out  who  is  to  blame.  Building  from  this,  we  argue  that  it  is  evident  that  MAS’  image  
restoration takes a point of departure in a two-dimensional focus. Firstly, the role of responsibility: 
deciding that someone, who is not them, must take responsibility. This ties into the other major 
focus, which is the lack of control. Helplessness is established through the insistence of MAS 
having followed every provided protocol. This helplessness not only frees them from the majority 
of the responsibility but it is further transformed into a trait of strength. Their resolution to figure 
out what really happened comes across more powerful since they are trying to be active in a 
situation where it may be argued that it is not expected of them. Their lack of control consists both 
of the uncontrollable factors of someone shooting down the aircraft and of the way they have 
chosen to frame the circumstances regarding the shooting. The event is emphasised as part of a 
geopolitical problem and there is a continued call to leaders and countries around the world to solve 
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the problem. MAS positions themselves as victims of a terror act and as a helpless actor in a 
geopolitical issue. Therefore, their ambition to help solve the problem in the midst of their 
helplessness actually displays their image in a highly favourable light: the damaged victim who is 
calling for help from others but is doing everything possible to help themselves and still they are 
looking out for their customers.  
This is how MAS chose to approach their crisis response but how does this correlate with the 
strategies  we  have  formulated  through  the  use  of  Coombs’  SCCT?  As  we  concluded  in  the  second  
analysis, we would suggest, vis-à-vis the recommendations entailed in SCCT, three primary 
strategies when considering the context: 1) scapegoating: MAS should remove any connection 
between the event and themselves and place the responsibility elsewhere 2) excuse: Excusing their 
role in the situation and leaning on the facts which are already widely in circulation regarding their 
involvement 3) compensation: MAS should seek to compensate the families of the victims with any 
form of emotional or psychological aid possible. Furthermore, the secondary strategy should be that 
of victimage; meaning that MAS should position themselves as victims, in order to, again remove 
as much responsibility from themselves as possible.  
 
A  quick  glance  at  the  brief  repetition  of  Coomb’s  strategies  show  the  great  coherence  between  what  
MAS actually did and what SCCT would recommend them to do. Though there are some 
discrepancies worth discussing.  
The most obvious one is the use of compensation. The compensation strategy, which we 
formulated, suggested that they helped the next-of-kin, but what they actually did was to go further 
than that and offer monetary compensation to all of their customers. MAS clearly deemed that their 
reputation was in such a state it required them to go above and beyond in their compensation 
strategy.  This  could  be  because  of  the  crisis’  obvious  proximity  to  the  first  crisis.  MAS feels 
obligated to make all their customers feel that they care for them. It is questionable if they would 
offer refunds to all their customers if they did not feel that they already had a reputation, which was 
tarnished from a previous crisis. As explained above, this crisis, on its own, provides justified and 
understandable ground for MAS to obtain distance and a victimised position to the events. But their 
reputation, based on the first crisis, had left them in a position in which, no matter what type of 
crisis, their image restoration attempts had to be very cognizant of their prior relationship to their 
stakeholders. This trail of thought further leads to a broader perspective when trying to understand 
their  choice  of  crisis  response.  Coombs’  inclusion  of  the  intensifying  factors  helps  garner  this.  The  
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first crisis has an overwhelming presence in the intensifying factors and shows a history of poor 
crisis communication management. Thus, the crisis response strategies in the MH17 case have a 
large redemptive aspect in them as well. In some ways this crisis, paradoxically, offers a chance to 
repair the company image, which was impaired some months before. Therefore, their choice of 
compensation is more substantial and wide than a crisis of this nature would typically warrant since 
it is repairing an image based on earlier events, not connected to the crisis at hand.  
When  considering  the  aforementioned  context,  MAS’  strong  offset  in  shaping  their  helplessness  and  
truth-seeking narrative also makes better sense. Their image is in such a state that it is necessary for 
them to present themselves in that specific light. The murkiness of the first crisis has to be avoided 
and a clear explanation of their role in this must therefore be immediately established. Instead of 
waiting for an external actor to take responsibility for the event they quickly distance themselves. 
The matter of who actually shot down the plane is important, as the analysis shows, but first and 
foremost MAS are establishing that it was not them. Both crises are unique in the way that they 
both contain great uncertainty, even mysticism, of what actually happened and who is to blame. 
After paying the price, in form of a damaged reputation from the first crisis, they are clearly 
determined to avoid the same situation in the second crisis. This is why they present and emphasise 
clear facts  regarding  the  flight’s  clean  record  and  the  information  they  were  given  regarding  the  
airspace. If anything, it is discernible that MAS has learned that blame must be assigned somewhere 
and so, they did that immediately as the crisis occured.  
REFLECTION  
Through our work with the empirical data, we discovered that statements within the press releases, 
containing  the  element  of  sympathy,  appeared  difficult  to  place  seamlessly  within  Benoit’s  Image  
Restoration  strategies.  In  Benoit’s  theory,  sympathy is only given a minor role under the strategy of 
bolstering. We believe, as our analysis has portrayed, that sympathy was an on-going element in the 
statements  such  as  “I  cannot  imagine  what  they  must  be  going  through  at  this  painful  time.”  (“I.  
Appendix - Statement  by  Prime  Minister”)  and  additionally  “Malaysia  mourns  the  loss  of  all  298  
passengers and crew. We feel for their families. (“I. Appendix - Statement by Minister of 
Transport”).  Other  similar  phrases  appear  in  the  various  statements  to  such  a degree that it is 
difficult to dismiss them as anomalies. 
As aforementioned, Benoit does put a minor emphasis on sympathy, but not in the degree that we 
deem necessary according to the extent it is being used in the press releases of MH17.  
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We also find the role of sympathy within SCCT questionable due to its demarcation. Coombs limits 
the use of sympathy to the early step of a crisis response, before the selection of crisis strategies, 
which constrains its possible usage. Coombs posits, that sympathy should be used in the step before 
deciding on what crisis strategy to implement. However, based on our textual analysis, it is evident 
that sympathy has a greater role and should be used as an on-going tool throughout the entirety of a 
crisis response.  
 
Given the importance of sympathy we would propose a new crisis response strategy under the name 
‘Expression  of  Sympathy’ on equal footing with the already established strategies.   
Our analysis leads to an acknowledgement that MAS should not be perceived as carrying much 
blame since the crisis can be said to be accidental and further can be victimised. Thus employing 
sympathy in their statements becomes a valuable tool. As we concluded in our analysis based on 
SCCT, the prior history of MAS has had an impact on how they manage the MH17 crisis. In the 
aftermath of the first crisis MAS experienced, the loss of MH370, they were heavily criticised for 
how they approached the sensitive aspects of crisis management as they showed a lack of sympathy 
towards stakeholders. The primary critique of the handling of the first crisis was related to how 
MAS notified the next-of-kin of the deceased. It was done via text messages, which led to them 
being perceived as cynical and without compassion for the loss of lives (Withnall, 2014). In an 
attempt to ensure the sympathy of their stakeholders, it has become apparent that MAS has aimed at 
changing this approach; presenting themselves as being compassionate in relation to the next-of-kin 
of the MH17 crisis, putting emphasis on the importance of human lives.  
Based on the aforementioned reflections it is evident that the lack of sympathy played a significant 
role  in  how  stakeholders’  perceived  MAS  in  the  aftermath  of  the  MH370  crisis. 
Juxtaposing the two crises, sympathy has shown to have a great say. For better or worse. The 
handling of the first crisis lacked sympathy to such a degree, that it was reckoned cynical. It is thus 
possible to construe, that the great use of sympathy in the second crisis as a lesson learned. It has 
had a major role in the statements throughout the entirety of the first 48-hours. Uniting these two 
elements,  we  deem  the  role  of  sympathy  vital  and  thus  see  sympathy  i.e.  ‘Expression  of  Sympathy’,  
as a strategy for organisations to employ faced with a crisis on equal term with the other strategies. 
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CONCLUSION  
The goal of conducting the two analyses was to investigate to what extent MAS had been effective 
in their communicatively handling of MH17 within the first 48 hours. By comparison, the two 
analyses showcased that there was great consistency in what, according to SCCT, should have been 
done, taking into account the situational factors of the crisis, and what was actually said by MAS. 
Having evaluated the reputational threat and all the elements within the model of SCCT, three 
primary strategies stood out as being the most suitable to the crisis of MH17 viz. scapegoating, 
excuse and compensation. These strategies fit greatly with the employed strategies, categorised by 
Benoit, of shift in blame, compensation, and corrective action. 
Though, incongruence betwixt the two approaches manifested itself in the strategy of 
compensation. MAS actually went further than what was expected of them and offered 
compensation not only to next-of-kin, but also monetary compensation to all their customers. This 
can be rationalised when taking the magnitude of their prior relationship with their stakeholders and 
their crisis history, involving MH370. In retrospect, we deem MAS as having handled their crisis 
communication effectively. 
The reason for this effectiveness could be ascribed to the continued use of shown sympathy. An 
element, we have found to be of greater importance than what is laid out by the strategies in SCCT 
and  Image  Restoration.  We  thus  see  ‘Expression  of  Sympathy’  as  a  reliable  strategy  that  should  be  
seen on an equal basis with the residual.  
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